humility and irony. For example, in his Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture, delivered in 2009 at Duke Law School, Professor Twining presented himself as the founder-and, so far, as the only member-of a 'new school of jurisprudence' , namely 'the self-critical legal studies movement' . He also acknowledged that-like all academic lawyers today-he found himself to be a'comparatist not by specialization, but by situation' . 1 There are two, at least two, references in here: one is to Roberto Unger's article in the Harvard Law Review on 'The Critical Legal Studies Movement' , which was later published in book form, 2 and another is to Karl Llewellyn's notion of the 'situation sense' . 3 This recent reference to academic lawyers being comparatists 'by situation' , however, appears to identify the context in which these lawyers are arguably operating today. For Professor Twining, these situations are, for better or worse, described as or associated with 'so-called "globalisation"' . The defining nature of these situations, for him, is that they are ones of pluralism-a wide field of study, both in theory and practice, in law and non-law, areas and demarcations to which Professor Twining has devoted an enormous amount of time and attention. there are conceptual problems however one defines or conceptualises law. The definitional stop is only one of several problems in this area, most of which are unlikely to be resolved by conceptual analysis or formal definitions alone.' 5 In the text that informs the present Symposium before us today, he writes: 'The problem of the "definitional stop"-where to draw the line between legal and non-legal, if one adopts a broad conception of law-has re-surfaced in the context of debates about legal pluralism. This is not a specific puzzle about legal pluralism as such, but is part of the perennial topic of how best to conceptualise law.' 6 In his Bernstein Lecture, he gave an elaborate account of the different, divergent and competing conceptions as well as realities of pluralism, never losing sight of the fact that 'when lawyers hear about legal pluralism many are puzzled, even resistant to the idea' . 7 For Professor Twining, the discussion of pluralism-on the one hand, as a social fact that concerns actually existing normative orders that bind human behaviour and, on the other, as a challenge to What we find here, and what is so equally forcefully illustrated by his comprehensive response to the contributors to our Symposium, is the generosity with which he engages with the work, the ideas, even the flaws, of others. It is also this generosity through which others are being placed at the centre of attention, in order to be pulled into a conversation the goal of which never appears to be the establishment of who is 'wrong' or who is 'right' , butthroughout-the pursuit of something grander. At the same time, the Montesquieu Lecture, which forms the starting point of this Symposium, is clearly addressed to legal scholars of all convictions, whether or not they understand themselves as doctrinalists or theorists, as globalisation scholars or teachers of domestic law. One of the lecture's best achievements is to present the challenges of globalisation processes for law in an accessible and informative, yet never oversimplifying manner. While it provides us with an eye-opening introduction to many of the currently found contentions among lawyers and social theorists investigating the impact of globalisation and transnationalisation processes, it contains numerous references to further reading and thought, inviting us to enter into the debate. ) have responded to it, is the approximation and interpenetration of different disciplinary approaches, then it will be unavoidable to ask to what degree lawyers and legal scholars must begin to think in an interdisciplinary fashion. 13 But, how should this be done? It appears as if the centrality of (normative and legal) pluralism in our current efforts to study the globalisation challenges for law presents a strong argument in favour of a multiand interdisciplinary approach. Whether it is the analysis of the function and operation of non-state norms in domestic and religious as well as associational settings 14 or of transnational regimes of global regulatory governance, 15 it has become increasingly obvious that a legal analysis needs to draw on insights from sociologists, anthropologists, economic and social geographers, to name just a few. This is the other side of the pair in the title 'globalisation and legal scholarship' , which depicts the topic of Professor Twining's lecture. His is a forceful reminder of how deeply embedded legal analysis is in a much bigger scholarly enterprise to make sense of this world. His own scholarship over the years attests to his acknowledgement of a need to constantly call into question and, eventually, to revise, adapt or scrap one's starting assumptions. For a largely state-based legal theory, the transnationalisation of regulatory regimes, whatever label we choose to apply from public to private, national or international to transnational, poses enormous challenges. 16 But, from the perspective of a legal theory that is opening itself up for an interdisciplinary investigation into the nature of emerging global orders, the messy, pluralist regimes present an important opportunity. The 'spatialisation' of regulatory frameworks on the transnational scale prompts (or should prompt 17 ) a conceptual and theoretical engagement that 'naturally' breaks down and redraws disciplinary boundaries, 18 meanwhile harking back to earlier work in legal pluralism in an attempt to continue to interrogate the relationship between differently conceived spheres of social ordering. 19 As Professor
Twining repeatedly emphasises, the line-drawing in the context of legal pluralism is not one of empirical observation but of qualification, which ultimately makes it a matter of choice. 20 With the recognition of a norm as 'law' comes the challenge of justifying this recognition. At that point, it is no longer possible to let all flowers bloom; one must call a rose by her name.
III
More or less just before the half-way point of his lecture, Professor Twining provides his readers with a most telling overview of the themes that he has 'identified inductively in over ten years of thinking about globalisation and law and general jurisprudence' . 22 These are the following:
• the whole Western tradition of academic law is based on several kinds of assumptions that need to be critically examined in a changing context;
• we lack concepts and data to generalise about legal phenomena in the world as a whole: analytic concepts that can transcend, at least to some extent, different legal traditions and cultures;
• comparison is the first step to generalisation and more sophisticated and expansive approaches to comparative law are critical for the development of a healthy discipline of law;
• we need more sophisticated normative theories that are well-informed and sensitive to pluralism of beliefs and differences between value systems; and, especially, we need improved empirical understandings of how legal doctrines, institutions and practices operate in 'the real world' . Regardless of where one's legal scholarship is primarily focused, it appears that it has become increasingly difficult to either disregard or avoid comparative perspectives.
[T]oday no scholar, or even student, of law can focus solely on the domestic law of a single jurisdiction … We are in an important sense all comparatists now, even if most of us lack sophistication in comparative method. Comparative law is increasingly more like a way of life than a marginal subject for a few specialists.
The processes of transnationalisation significantly increase this trend. of the school's offering in international student exchanges. 34 Meanwhile, efforts are underway-with varying success-to include comparative/transnational law elements in the first-year law school curriculum. 35 In my view, first-year law courses are the decisive laboratories for a radical transformation of legal education with a commitment to transnational legal thought. Rather than offering specialised seminars to those few students already interested in 'international law' , the key will be to illustrate the transnationalisation of law at the heart of what is usually considered as law with a merely domestic scope. Such an enterprise requires substantive efforts on the part of professors and law schools. The former would have to sit down to review their course programs in a given area (say contracts, torts, property, constitutional) and identify cases or case studies with a transnational dimension.
Such examples could receive a slightly expanded treatment in class, introducing students to a way of reading a case or approaching a legal regulatory challenge 'in context' and 'in action' . Building on groundbreaking work in that regard, 36 the present task consists in illustrating to students as future members of a transnational profession the radically expanding and evolving context of their work and of the cases they will be working on. 37 The next theme Professor Twining mentions concerns the unavailability of 'concepts and data to generalise about legal phenomena as a whole' . While that is true in a sense, it is also a considerable understatement, as Professor Twining is one who approaches and engages with the longstanding and emerging developments that bring lawyers in closer dialogue with political philosophers 38 and the 'global justice' thinkers building on that work, 39 as well as with sociologists and legal pluralists who have been studying the world from a postnational perspective with enormous curiosity and respect. ) process of experimentation and consolidation, interdisciplinary transformation, and apparently unending moments of self-doubt. 45 Meanwhile, many of these woes seem to be directly related to the anxieties that accompany the erosion of belief systems and of models formerly held to be of a more stable and reliable nature. 46 To me, crucial in this regard is Professor Twining's insistence on the notion of 'interdependence' , on recognising the challenge of normative and legal pluralism as existing in both spheres of the Global South and the Global North, 47 and-importantly-as being a phenomenon which confronts us on the 'sub-global' level.
A high proportion of processes loosely referred to as 'global' operate at more limited subglobal levels. These levels, insofar as they are spatial, are not nested in a single vertical hierarchy-galactic, global, regional, national, sub-state, local and so on. Interdependence is largely a function of proximity or closeness:
proximity can be spatial (geographical contiguity), colonial, military, linguistic, religious, historical, or legal. In other words, a picture of patterns of law in the world needs to take account of regions, empires, diasporas, alliances, trading partners, pandemics, legal traditions and families. The British Empire, the Englishspeaking world, religious and ethnic diasporas, the common law world, 'the Arab world' , even so-called 'World Wars' are all sub-global; so it is misleading to talk about them as if they apply to the world as a whole. 48 Sociologists, geographers and lawyers who are embracing a spatial conception of social order have pointed to the need to interrogate the legally fixed boundaries of competence, power and authority (jurisdiction) in order to pick up the actual dynamics of human (as well as institutional) interaction and the evolution of post-jurisdictional regimes in an effort to better understand and appreciate the artificial nature of boundaries that are drawn by legal rights. 49 As Professor Eve Darian-Smith, one of the contributors to this Symposium, has argued elsewhere: 'In an attempt to transcend the artificiality of a global/local divide and the opening up of legal spaces previously unrecognized, new legal ethnographies suggest that the impact and production of globalization-however defined-occur within and without the formal boundaries of nation-states. Moreover, these studies indicate that in any examination of law and its relationship to globalization, analysis must take into account a range of theoretical perspectives and subject positions.' 50 The reciprocal deconstruction between a state-oriented comparatist agenda and a post-grand narratives 51 search for normative theory/ies has significant echoes in the current troubles of adapting legal doctrine, theory and methodology to the 'complex and bewildering processes' of globalisation, processes-to be sure-that are grounded in a global social context and, by consequence, implicate stark degrees of winning and losing. 52 In particular we are here concerned with the relationship between doctrinal claim making and empirical fact assessment, which informs the fifth and last theme in Professor
Twining's enumeration. In short, this theme is a rallying call to reinvigorate a type of socio-legal studies that was once at the forefront of legal theory and legal education reform, with a dedicated commitment to interdisciplinarity, empirical assessment and field work in an effort to study the actual processes of norm implementation and (the trials and tribulations of) legal change. 53 It is here that an entire-and yet not entirely new-world seems to be opening up.
The much discussed, more recent 'empirical turn' in law and international relations 54 has its roots in a rich context of longer-coming approximations between law and social but also 'hard' sciences, 55 specifically in the selfcritical assessment of law's volatile knowledge basis. 56 The promise lies in the embrace of this project on several methodological levels. The dynamic relations and, in fact, tensions between normative and legal pluralism at both supraand sub-state levels require a re-invigoration of legal theory as a historically informed, 
